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LEVERAGE: STATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN 
THE WAKE OF THE ROBO-SIGN SCANDAL 
Raymond H. Brescia∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2010, the revelations that tens of thousands of foreclosure filings 
across the nation were likely fraudulent—if not outright criminal—sparked a 
nation-wide investigation by all fifty state attorneys general to assess the extent of 
the scandal and its potential impacts, but also to consider likely legal and policy 
responses to such behavior.  One of the tools at the state attorneys general’s 
disposal that might rein in this behavior includes each state’s Unfair and Deceptive 
Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws.   Such laws typically prohibit “unfair” and 
“deceptive” practices, which are described loosely in these laws, and often give 
consumers, as well as state attorneys general, the ability to bring affirmative 
litigation to rein in practices that violate their provisions.  They are often drafted 
with less specificity than other laws, and give litigants and the courts a certain 
degree of leeway in mapping out their contours in response to evolving market 
practices.  In this way, UDAP laws serve a critical consumer protection function by 
filling in gaps in the law where other, more targeted laws might not cover practices 
that have a harmful impact on consumers.  Since their inception, UDAP laws have 
been used to rein in abusive practices in such areas as used car sales, telemarketing 
and even the sale of tobacco products.  This article explores the availability of 
UDAP laws and the remedies they provide to rein in the range of practices revealed 
in the so-called “Robo-Sign Scandal.”  It concludes that such practices—the false 
affidavits, reckless claims, and improper notarizations—all violate the essence of 
most state UDAP laws; accordingly, the remedies available under such laws may 
be wielded by state attorneys general to halt abusive foreclosure practices 
throughout the nation.  What is more, UDAP actions in light of robo-sign abuses 
could help chart a path towards a more robust mortgage modification regime, one 
that would result in principal reductions.  In the end, such strategies offer the 
clearest path out of the current foreclosure crisis. 
This paper is divided into seven sections.  Sections two and three provide 
overviews, respectively, of the present state of the foreclosure scandal as well as 
state UDAP laws generally.  The fourth section discusses the use of state UDAP 
laws to combat predatory lending in the last decade.  The fifth analyzes the 
prospects for applying UDAP laws and remedies to improprieties in the foreclosure 
process itself.  Section six discusses a potential barrier to the use of the UDAP laws 
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in the foreclosure context: namely, the threat of federal pre-emption of such UDAP 
laws and enforcement actions. 
II.  THE ROBO-SIGN SCANDAL. 
In late September 2010, fact-finding processes in several foreclosure cases 
revealed rampant fraud in the manner in which many banks handled those and 
many other foreclosures.1  The most egregious example of such fraud could be 
found in what has come to be known as “robo-signing”: the use of surrogates to 
sign foreclosure paperwork.2  In many instances, the fraud goes much deeper, 
however, revealing fundamental problems with the claims of many banks in tens of 
thousands of foreclosure cases.  These revelations raise doubts about whether these 
banks even have the right to foreclose on borrowers where such banks have 
difficulty proving that they are a party to the mortgages that underlie the 
foreclosure actions in question.3  In order to explain these problems, a brief 
description of the mortgage origination, securitization, and foreclosure processes is 
in order. 
A.  Background: Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Recording Acts. 
When a borrower takes out a mortgage to purchase a property, he or she makes 
a promise to the bank that the mortgage loan will be paid back, and typically 
“secures” that loan by pledging the property purchased as collateral for the loan.4  
If the borrower defaults on the loan, the bank can seek to take back the collateral 
securing that loan: the home.  In nearly half of U.S. states, banks seeking to 
foreclose on a property for the borrower’s failure to maintain his or her obligations 
on the loan must go through the courts to seek a court order to foreclose on the 
property.5  This process, which dates back hundreds of years, is known as the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. On the origins of the underlying events that revealed the practices that have come to be known 
as the Robo-Sign Scandal, see David Streitfeld, From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure Freeze, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/ 
15maine.html.  
 2. For a description of robo-signing practices, see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 
OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 9 (2010) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL], available 
at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
111610-report.pdf. 
 3. See  Rod S. Dubitsky, Foreclosure Flaws Trigger New Round of Uncertainty, PIMCO ADVISORY  
(Jan.  2011), http://www.pimco.com/Pages/ForeclosureFlawsTriggerNewRoundofUncertainty.aspx. 
 4. See DAVID SIROTA, ESSENTIALS OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE 111 (2003) (stating  “[i]n exchange 
for a certain consideration, usually a sum of money, a mortgagor will pledge property as collateral to 
back up the promise to repay a mortgage.”).   
 5. John Carney, A Primer on the Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/A_Primer_On_The_Foreclosure_Crisis (noting that “[t]wenty-three 
states . . . require banks to go to court to get a foreclosure order. These are the ‘judicial states.’”).  See 
also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 12 n.17 (stating that “[t]wenty-two states require 
judicial oversight of foreclosure proceedings.”).  But see JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC 
PROTECTIONS 12 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_ 
laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf (placing the number of non-judicial foreclosure states at 31, including 
the District of Columbia, leaving only 20 “judicial states”).  According to Rao and Walsh, the non-
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process of foreclosure, an ancient remedy which “foreclosed” the borrower’s right 
of “redemption”: the right to satisfy the mortgage.6  Over the years, in the “judicial 
foreclosure states,” when a borrower is in default and the lender wishes to take 
back the collateral, pursuing a court order that will transfer title in the property to 
the lender is the exclusive remedy available to lenders to enforce the provisions of 
the mortgage agreement.7   
In the thirty states that permit “non-judicial foreclosures,” a court order is not 
required to reclaim title to the property through foreclosure.8  The lender simply 
gives notice to the borrower that it intends to foreclose on the property.9  Title to 
the property is typically auctioned to a third party and the transfer of the interest in 
the property brings with it a right to seek a court order to remove the borrower from 
the home, if he or she has not voluntarily vacated the premises.10 
                                                                                                                 
judicial foreclosure states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.  By implication, 
the “judicial states” would be: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.          
 6. Traditionally, this right of redemption was a right a borrower could exercise even after he or she 
lost the property to the lender and the lender sold it to a third party.  By exercising the right of 
redemption, the borrower could often regain the property, and evict the new purchaser, simply by paying 
off the debt.  The right to “foreclose the right of redemption” arose as a lender’s equitable remedy to 
prevent the borrower from coming back later to claim the property.  By obtaining a court order 
foreclosing the right of redemption, the lender, and any subsequent purchaser, was able to make certain 
that a sale of the property would not be challenged later by the borrower seeking to reclaim the property 
by paying off the debt.  For an overview of the history of foreclosure law, see  GRANT S. NELSON & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 7-10 (4th ed. 2001); Michael H. Schill, An Economic 
Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991). 
 7. See Carney, supra note 5. 
 8. See RAO, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that “in thirty states and the District of Columbia, 
homeowners can lose their homes with no court oversight over the process and without an opportunity 
to be heard.”).   
 9. Id.  (stating that in the non-judicial foreclosure states “foreclosures are accomplished by the 
mortgage holder’s exercise of the ‘power of sale’ contained in the mortgage or deed of trust. The 
mortgage holder does not need to initiate a court proceeding to foreclose and the homeowner has no 
clear access to a court hearing. The holder typically only needs to send a notice of sale to the 
homeowner, place a legal advertisement in a local newspaper, and hire an auctioneer to sell the property 
on the scheduled sale date.”) 
 10. See, e.g., Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending 
the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 
149 (2006) (“The auctioneer generally sells the property to the highest bidder….Sometimes, the highest 
bidder may (1) take immediate possession of the premises upon full payment of the purchase price; or 
(2) obtain an order for immediate possession from the court.”); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, 
Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1507 (2004) 
(“Once foreclosure has occurred, sale purchasers sometimes have difficulty obtaining physical 
possession of the real estate from those whose rights the foreclosure has terminated…. [I]f foreclosure is 
nonjudicial, the purchaser faces a dilemma when possession is not surrendered voluntarily. Self-help, 
peaceable or otherwise, generally may not be used to acquire possession.”).  See also, Rao, supra note 5, 
at 12 (“After the auctioneer’s hammer falls in most states, the sale itself is final and cannot be undone…. 
Only after the foreclosure sale is there a court proceeding in these states to remove a homeowner who 
does not voluntarily vacate, but by then it is usually too late to contest the sale.”). 
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Once property is used as collateral to secure loans, there is a heightened risk 
that conflicting claims will arise over the right to title of the property.  Disputes can 
occur at practically every step of the process: whether the borrower is in default, 
which would trigger the lender’s right to foreclose; whether the lender properly 
foreclosed on the property by following the appropriate procedures for doing so; 
whether a third-party purchasing the property out of foreclosure had a right to do 
so, to name just a few.  Over the years, important legal protections have been put in 
place to minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the risk that conflicting claims to 
the property will arise.11  One of the most important of these protections is that in 
many jurisdictions a lender must maintain, in its possession, the original loan 
documents to prove that he or she has the right to foreclose on the property.12  
Without such evidence of authority to foreclose, multiple parties could claim the 
right to foreclose, making it unclear to a borrower who he or she should pay to 
maintain his or her mortgage obligations.13  Furthermore, prospective third-party 
purchasers of properties after foreclosure might purchase such properties from 
parties that do not have the right to foreclose upon and sell such properties.14  
Multiple parties could claim title: the borrower, who might protest that he or she is 
current on his or her mortgage; the lender who possesses the original mortgage 
documents; a third-party purchaser, claiming he or she purchased the property from 
a party claiming to have had the right to sell it.15   
Another important mechanism for protecting the rightful claims of lenders, 
borrowers, and third-parties is the manner through which each state requires 
anyone with an interest in property to notify appropriate authorities of that interest 
by recording evidence of that interest in a central, publicly accessible location or 
through some electronic, publicly searchable database.16  These property recording 
systems, typically administered at the local level, serve as central access points for 
anyone who may wish to purchase property to determine who claims an interest in 
the property he or she wishes to buy.17  Research at the local level will reveal the 
presence of property law claims so that one can purchase property with confidence 
that no one with a conflicting claim will come forward later to challenge the 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Schill, supra note 6, at 492.    
 12. Kenneth M. DeLashmutt, Does the Lender Have the “Original” Note in Hand?, BANK FRAUD 
VICTIM CENTER, http://mortgage-home-loan-bank-fraud.com/articles/stop_foreclosure.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2011).   See also High Court’s Low Opinion of Foreclosure Process, WHERE’S OUR MONEY? 
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.wheresourmoney.org/?p=1318. 
 13. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 5. 
 14. Id. (stating that “if [clear and uncontested property rights] are called into question . . . . 
Borrowers who have already suffered foreclosure may seek to regain title to their homes and force any 
new owners to move out. Would-be buyers and sellers could find themselves in limbo, unable to know 
with any certainty whether they can safely buy or sell a home.”).   
 15. Id.  For a comparison of judicial and non-judicial foreclosure processes, see Georgina W. Kwan, 
Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for Mortgage Foreclosure Reform in Hawai’i, 24 HAW. L. 
REV. 245, 253-257 (2001). 
 16. New York City’s ACRIS database is one example of an online, searchable database that tracks 
interests in real property located within that city.  See New York City’s Automated City Register 
Information System, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/jump/acris.shtml (last visited Oct. 
28, 2011). 
 17. Bill Bronchik, The Property Recording System, REICLUB.COM,  http://reiclub.com/articles/ 
property-recording-system (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
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purchase because the seller of the property did not have the legal right to sell it.  As 
the following discussion shows, practices in the mortgage market over the last 
decade mean these protections are more important, not less.  This phenomenon 
makes the problems revealed in the present scandal even more troublesome.18 
B.  The Modern Mortgage Market and the Rise of Securitization. 
The modern mortgage market does not resemble the picture painted of it in the 
film “It’s a Wonderful Life.”  There, the venerable Bailey Building & Loan used 
depositors’ funds to make mortgage loans to local borrowers.  As Jimmy Stewart’s 
George Bailey intones when he faces his depositors who have gathered and are 
making a run on the institution, seeking to withdraw their savings: “the money’s 
not here, it’s in Joe’s house, that’s right next to yours, and in the Kennedy house 
and Mrs. Maicklin’s house and a hundred others.”19  This quaint approach to 
community banking is now all but extinct.  For the most part, gone are the days 
when a local lender makes mortgage loans in its local community and keeps such 
loans on its books for the duration of those loans.  During the height of the 
subprime mortgage mania of the last decade, “originate to securitize” was the 
widespread practice, changing the rules of the game, and leading to many of the 
present problems exposed by the Robo-Sign Scandal.20 
For decades, banks engaged in mortgage lending faced a liquidity problem.21  
They would have funds to lend to prospective borrowers, but those funds would be 
tied up in long-term, fixed rate loans once they committed those funds to a loan.22  
While the business of banking may have been boring and slow moving, it certainly 
could lead to steady, if not fantastic, profits.  In the 1970s, a new model arose that 
promised to revolutionize mortgage finance, although it would not grow in 
popularity until the late 1990s.23  Under this approach, known as mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 18. The facts revealed in the Robo-Sign Scandal raise the specter that it may take years to work 
through the apparent defects in title of many of the entities claiming to hold mortgages on individual 
properties and of anyone who has purchased property from such entities.  This process will inevitably 
raise transaction costs associated with proving title to land so that owners can use such property to 
secure capital and, should they wish, alienate it freely.  Such a process can hamper economic 
development considerably.  As Hernando de Soto argues, a functioning system of property titling is 
often what distinguishes functioning and dynamic economies from ones that are stagnant. HERNANDO 
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHED IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE 39-68 (2000). 
 19. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).  
 20. In 2008, then Securities and Exchange Commissioner Christopher Cox argued that the 
“originate to securitize” model was at the heart of the financial crisis because of the incentives such an 
approach created: “When mortgage lending changed from originate-to-hold to originate-to-securitize, an 
important market discipline was lost.  The lenders no longer had to worry about the future losses on the 
loans, because they had already cashed out.”  The Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit 
Crisis for the Future of Regulation, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
110th Cong. 26 (2008).   
 21. KENNETH W. EDWARDS, YOUR SUCCESSFUL REAL ESTATE CAREER 98 (2007). 
 22. Id.  (stating that “[i]n the past, lenders were badly burned when changing economic 
circumstances forced them to start paying more for their money while their assets were tied up in long 
term, low-yielding real estate loans.”).   
 23. Arturo Estrella, Securitization and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy, 8 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 3, 5 (2002), available at http://ftp.ny.frb.org/research/epr/02v08n1/0205estr.pdf. 
2011] LEVERAGE 23 
securitization, lenders could convert the future income stream they could generate 
from the promise of mortgage payments into a present cash payoff.24  Other 
institutions, typically investment banks, would purchase the right to collect the 
future income streams from loan originators by purchasing the mortgage from that 
originator.25  The investment bank would then bundle mortgages, representing the 
income streams they would generate, into investment vehicles.26  Those investment 
banks would then sell the right to collect those future income streams to other 
investors.27  With securitization, lenders could generate profits not from the 
payments they would receive from the borrowers over the length of the loans they 
made to such borrowers, but, rather, from the fees they could collect from the 
investment banks for selling the loans to those banks.28  
With the growth of mortgage securitization, the business model of many 
mortgage lenders would evolve over time.29  Their main focus would change from 
assessing the quality of a prospective borrower and the likelihood that he or she 
would pay back a loan over time, to calculating the fees the lender could collect by 
selling loans to investment banks.30  Given the short-term gains mortgage lenders 
could reap from selling such loans as quickly as possible to those banks, the 
quantity of loans the lender could sell was more important than the quality of such 
loans: i.e., total loan volume was more important than the likelihood that any 
particular borrower would pay back his or her loan.31 
But mortgage securitization would not take root as a widespread practice in the 
mortgage industry until the early 2000s, when global events would whet the 
appetite of investors for mortgage-backed securities.32  In the aftermath of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the recession that followed, the Federal 
Reserve slashed interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities in order to spur 
investment and prevent a complete investor retreat to the safety of those 
securities.33  Investors looked for other investment vehicles, and mortgage-backed 
securities seemed to fit that bill: they held out the promise of solid returns on 
investment and the underlying securities earned a “AAA” rating from credit ratings 
agencies (i.e., typically the highest grade those ratings agencies assign).34  What is 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 3.  See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the 
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (providing an overview of the securitization 
process and its role in the financial crisis).   
 25. Eggert, supra note 24, at 1259.   
 26. Id. at 1266.   
 27. Id.   
 28. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE 
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 76 (2010) (providing a description of the role of the fee structure in the 
securitization process and its relation to loan volume); MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360º LOOK 
AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 95 (2009) 
(same). 
 29. See Eggert, supra note 24, at 1264-68.   
 30. ZANDI, supra note 28, at 95-96; Eggert, supra note 24, at 1268.   
 31. See Eggert, supra note 24, at 1268 (discussing the impact of securitization on the mortgage 
market).     
 32. DANIEL GROSS, DUMB MONEY: HOW OUR GREATEST FINANCIAL MINDS BANKRUPTED THE 
NATION 13–20 (2009). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 28, at 131. 
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more, this appetite for mortgage-backed securities coincided with the rise of a 
number of other phenomena. First, “innovations” in mortgage products began to 
take hold, and the dominance of the market by the standard 30-year fixed rate 
mortgage gave way to a slew of new mortgage products: adjustable rate mortgages; 
higher-interest mortgages; and more exotic products, like no documentation loans, 
interest only loans, and negative amortizing loans.35  These non-standardized 
products were used to bring non-traditional borrowers into the mortgage market: 
i.e., borrowers with lower credit scores; with little history with credit; with lower, 
less regular incomes; and with few assets.36  Although many touted the benefits of 
homeownership,37 expanding the pool of prospective borrowers ultimately served 
one larger end: creating more mortgages to securitize, which would lead to more 
fees for originators, mortgage brokers, investment banks, and the credit ratings 
agencies that assessed the investment quality of the mortgage-backed securities at 
the center of the fee-generating chain.38 
C.  Drawing a Line from Securitization to the Robo-Sign Scandal. 
In retrospect, the connection between securitization and the Robo-Sign 
Scandal appears quite clear.  During the height of the subprime mortgage market, 
the business model of mortgage lenders—those entities that originate mortgages—
was one built on quick resale of their product, not long-term “curation”: a more 
traditional approach that included cultivating borrowers for a relationship that 
extended through the life of the loan.39  As economist Joseph Stiglitz40 and FDIC 
Chair Sheila Bair41 both assert, one of the chief causes of the collapse of the 
mortgage market in the United States was the breakdown of this traditional 
borrower-lender relationship.  With a focus on the quantity of the loans they could 
generate, and not their quality, that quality dropped considerably, particularly in the 
later years of the housing bubble.42  Lenders sought a continuous stream of 
borrowers, creating innovative lending products to bring down traditional barriers 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and 
How will it End, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN., no. 2, 2007, at 13-15 (describing lowering of underwriting 
criteria and creation of exotic loan products). 
 36. See id.   
 37. See generally ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US (2009) 
(describing efforts by elected officials to promote homeownership in the United States).  
 38. See ZANDI, supra note 28, at 95 (discussing the role of the mortgage originators’ compensation 
structure in the securitization process and its impact on the mortgage market);  Krinsman, supra note 35, 
at 13 (providing an overview of the expansion of the subprime mortgage market in the 2000s).  
 39. Arva Rice, Subprime Lenders Could Have Learned a Thing or Two From New York, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arva-rice/subprime-lenders-could-
ha_b_76538.html (stating “[s]o why have we succeeded where others failed? Well, for one reason, 
because we based our business model on opportunity, not failure.”). 
 40. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 14 (2010). 
 41. Sheila C. Blair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Address before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services: Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures 
(Apr. 17,2007) (transcript available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/ 
chairman/ spapr1707.html). 
 42. See, Krinsman, supra note 35, at 14-15 (describing the lowering of underwriting criteria to 
expand the pool of mortgage borrowers). 
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that kept potential customers from taking out loans.43  This fed not only the 
lenders’ own appetite for the fees selling those mortgages could generate, but also 
the desire of investors to increase their holdings in mortgage-backed securities (not 
to mention the interest of those investors who wanted to “short” the housing 
market—generate securities, particularly ones that might underperform, so that 
they could bet they would fail through the purchase of “Credit Default Swap” 
insurance to protect against such failure).44 
But this focus on quantity not quality lies at the heart of the Robo-Sign 
Scandal in many less obvious ways.  First, as these mortgages were packaged, sold 
and re-sold on the secondary mortgage market, buyers and sellers of those 
mortgages were often overwhelmed with the sheer volume of mortgages they 
needed to process and the speed with which those mortgages changed hands.45  As 
a result, in the securitization process, not all transactions were properly 
documented and recorded, and bank personnel often failed to secure and maintain 
original documents throughout the course of these transactions.46  Second, once 
millions of mortgages went into default, servicers and lenders charged with 
foreclosing on those mortgages were overwhelmed with the sheer volume of 
mortgages that needed some form of action taken due to borrower delinquency.47  
As a result, we now know that in tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of 
instances, institutions seeking to foreclose on mortgages failed to follow basic 
procedural rules for filing papers in foreclosure actions; it is this failure that lies at 
the heart of the Robo-Sign Scandal.48 
The acts underlying this scandal include the following:  In documents 
submitted to courts where foreclosure actions were being pursued, sworn affidavits 
contained a range of potentially false and/or frivolous allegations.  These 
documents, signed under oath, included allegations that the bank official or the 
employee of a loan servicer who signed the affidavit: (1) reviewed essential 
documents related to the case, (2) could attest that the borrower was in default, and 
(3) could make representations that the plaintiff in the case (the lender, servicer or 
other entity claiming an interest in the mortgage) had the right to pursue the 
foreclosure of the property securing the mortgage allegedly in default.  These 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id.   
 44. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 28 (2010) (discussing 
the role of investors “shorting” the housing market).   
 45. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7, 9-11.   
 46. See Gretchen Morgenson, Trying to Put a Price on Bank Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at 
BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/business/21gret.html?pagewanted=all.   
 47. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7, 9-11 (stating that bank “employees were 
having trouble keeping up with the crush of foreclosures.”).   
 48. See id. at 9.  The report outlines one example: 
In a June 7, 2010, deposition, Jeffrey Stephan, who worked for GMAC Mortgage as a 
“limited signing officer,” testified that he signed 400 documents each day.  In at least 
some cases, he signed affidavits without reading them and without a notary present. . . . 
Similarly, [Bank of America was] faced with revelations that robo-signers had signed 
tens of thousands of foreclosure documents without actually verifying the information in 
them . . . .  
Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted). 
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affidavits were then purportedly notarized in the presence of a notary public.49 As 
the following discussion shows, in many cases, virtually every aspect of these 
affidavits was defective. 
First, the affiants (the individuals signing the affidavits), signing these 
documents on behalf of his or her employer (the plaintiff in the case), often did not 
review any documents in the case prior to signing the affidavit.50  Second, even if 
the affiant did review records related to the case, the records related to borrower 
payment history were often incomplete or inaccurate.51  Third, the affiant had no 
way of proving that his or her employer had the original documents in its 
possession to prove that the plaintiff had the right to bring the action.52  Fourth, the 
affiant, in all too many instances, simply did not sign the affidavit personally: this 
task was often delegated to other employees who, themselves, had no knowledge of 
the contents of the affidavit and forged the signature of the person whose name 
appeared on it.53  Finally, just as the affidavits were forged in many instances, the 
individuals serving as notaries public often did not witness the signature of the 
affiant, despite acknowledging such signature and certifying them for filing with a 
court.54  These affidavits, with all of these fatal defects, were then filed in courts 
throughout the country in support of claims that foreclosure actions should go 
forward.55  
Despite the wide-spread nature of this scandal, for the most part, courts have 
yet to mete out penalties for these activities.56  At present, the attorneys general of 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 11 n.12; Brady Dennis, Robo-Signer Played 
Quiet Role in Huge Number of Foreclosures, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206650.html 
(describing the acts and practices that have come to be known as robo-signing); Gretchen Morgenson, 
Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/04mortgage.html?pagewanted=all.. 
 50. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that employees were signing hundreds 
of documents each day without verifying information contained within).   
 51. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Probe Targets Foreclosure Paperwork, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704164004575548580189204898.html. 
 52. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing a 2007 study that showed 
“mortgage companies who filed claims to be paid in bankruptcy cases of homeowners did not attach a 
copy of the note to 40% of their claims.”). 
 53. Id. at 7 (stating “[e]mployees . . . have testified that they signed, and in some cases backdated, 
thousands of documents attesting to personal knowledge of facts about the mortgage and the property 
that they did not actually know to be true.”).   
 54. See David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosure Furor Rises; Many Call for a Freeze, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/ 
06mortgage.html?_r=2& ref=your-money. 
 55. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 11-12.  The extent to which similar practices 
infected foreclosure actions in non-judicial foreclosure states is still unknown.  Hopefully, the attorney 
general investigation will reveal whether such practices spread into those states as well.  As the Ibanez 
case, discussed infra, reveals, however, defects in a foreclosing mortgagee’s title can have an impact in 
non-judicial foreclose states as well by raising questions about the validity of title of subsequent 
purchasers who buy property from those mortgagees after foreclosure. 
 56. Even before the facts concerning robo-signing came to light, conscientious judges handling 
foreclosure actions noted the inability of at least some mortgagees to establish their standing to sue in 
foreclosure actions because they were unable to prove that they held an interest in the properties that 
were the subject of the actions.  See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 84011 (N.D. 
Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing foreclosure actions for plaintiffs’ failure to establish their ownership 
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all fifty states are conducting an investigation into the abuses described above. 57 
But what remedies, if any, are available to such public officials for these practices?   
First and foremost, many of these acts involved criminal conduct.  Affidavits 
must be signed under oath and under the penalties of perjury.  Those penalties in 
many states are criminal in nature.  That allegations were made with no basis in 
fact (e.g., that an affiant had reviewed bank records, when he or she had not); that 
documents were forged; that signatures were improperly notarized: all of these acts 
open the participants in this course of conduct to criminal prosecution.  Moreover, 
the filing of such fraudulent documents that contain blatant misrepresentations, 
omissions, and errors may have consumer protection implications as well.  The 
remainder of this paper addresses this issue: did robo-sign practices expose lenders, 
mortgage servicers, and other entities responsible for such acts to civil liability 
under state consumer protections laws?   
III.  STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION THROUGH “UDAP” LAWS. 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have some statutory ban on unfair 
or deceptive practices in trade or commerce.58  Many of these Unfair and Deceptive 
Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws were adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s as 
states sought new tools to protect consumers from abusive business practices.59  
These laws are modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which 
Congress passed in 1914 and makes unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”60  These state UDAP statutes are often referred to as “little FTC Acts,” 
and provide a wide array of tools to consumers and state attorneys general to 
combat unfair and deceptive business practices.  One of the limitations of the 
FTCA is that it is typically only enforced by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.  
Unlike the FTCA, however, all state UDAP statutes grant consumers a private right 
of action to enforce their provisions61 and state attorneys general also have standing 
to bring actions alleging UDAP violations.62 
                                                                                                                 
interest in the underlying mortgages); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Yeasmin, No. 50927U, slip op. at *6 
(N.Y. App. Div. May 24, 2010) (finding arguments of counsel regarding plaintiff’s right to foreclose “so 
incredible, outrageous, ludicrous and disingenuous that they should have been authored by the late Rod 
Serling, creator of the famous science-fiction television series, The Twilight Zone.”). See also Raymond 
H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a Problem-Solving Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 345 n.144 (2009) (collecting early cases).  
 57. Diana Olick, State AG Robosigning Settlement Brewing, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2010, 7:06PM), 
available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/40220735/State_AG_Robosigning_Settlement_Brewing. 
 58. CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50 STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR 
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/ 
images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.   
 59. Id. at 5-6.   
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 61. See CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 
§§ 7.2.1-7.2.2 (7th ed. 2008) (providing a general discussion of private rights of action under different 
states’ UDAP provisions).  Until recently, all states’ UDAP laws except Iowa’s granted individuals a 
private right of action to sue for violations of those laws. In 2009, the Iowa legislature amended that 
state’s statute to permit such private rights of action.  2009 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 167 (West). 
 62. See CARTER, supra note 58, at 6.   
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The FTCA and its state cousins are broad and remedial in nature, and prohibit 
conduct in general terms rather than drawing strict lines and giving clear guidance 
about what is outlawed and what is not.63  When Congress first passed the FTCA, it 
recognized the limitations of drafting overly specific provisions given the shifting 
nature of unfair and deceptive conduct and the impossibility of spelling out every 
type of behavior the FTCA would prohibit: 
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no 
limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were 
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over 
again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an 
endless task.64 
Consistent with this approach, while some state statutes specifically describe the 
acts that can constitutes violations of those states’ UDAP statutes,65 many of these 
laws contain general prohibitions against unfair or deceptive practices.66  With the 
goal of adapting to changing practices in the market, they contain specific clauses 
that describe some acts as unfair or deceptive, but also include “catch all” 
provisions that rein in any conduct that could be construed as unfair or deceptive.67  
As a further example of the deep connections between state laws and the FTCA, 
many states specifically incorporate interpretations of the FTCA into the judicial 
treatment and interpretation of their own UDAP statutes.68 
In 2002, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a 
guidance letter on unfair and deceptive mortgage practices in which it re-stated 
Federal Trade Commission interpretations of the meaning of the key components 
of the FTCA.69  The OCC laid out the basic elements of claims arising under the 
FTCA and UDAP statutes as follows:  
For an act to qualify as a “deceptive” practice, the following must occur:  
• There is a representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead.  
• The act or practice would be deceptive from the perspective of a reasonable 
consumer.  
                                                                                                                 
 63. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (providing simply that “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful.”). 
 64. H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142 (1914). 
 65. See, e.g., Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903 (2011) (outlining 
thirty-two specific grounds that violate the act). 
 66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  For a comprehensive overview of UDAP laws, see 
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61. 
 67. For example, the Kansas Consumer Protection Act defines “deceptive acts and practices” as 
“include[ing], but … not limited to,” a series of specifically enumerated acts.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
626(b) (2009).   
 68. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(b) (2011) (expressing intent of state legislature that 
courts interpreting state statute should be guided by interpretations of the FTCA). 
 69. JULIE L. WILLIAMS & EMORY W. RUSHTON, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, 
OCC ADVISORY LETTER: GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES  3-6 (Mar. 22, 
2002), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2002/advisory-
letter-2002-3.pdf. 
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• The representation, omission, act, or practice is material.70  
In terms of “unfair” practices, those occur when the following are present: 
• The practice causes substantial consumer injury.  
• The injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competition.  
• The injury caused by the practice is one that consumers could not reasonably 
have avoided.71 
Not only are UDAP statutes to be interpreted broadly, the remedies available 
to UDAP litigants are varied in scope and powerful.  Unlike the FTCA, private 
individuals in most states have a right to bring an action under UDAP statutes, 
while the attorneys general of every state have the authority to bring actions under 
their respective UDAP statutes.  Since this paper focuses on those enforcement 
powers of attorneys general only, the following discussion highlights the remedies 
available in such cases.72  Where an attorney general pursues a UDAP violation in 
the courts, the remedies he or she may pursue often include the following: the 
imposition of statutorily created civil penalties and fines; the assessment of 
damages suffered by victims of the defendant as a result of violations of UDAP 
provisions, often awarded in the form of restitution; the award of punitive damages 
in some instances; the grant of costs and, at times, attorneys’ fees to successful 
litigants; and the issuance of injunctions against unfair and deceptive practices.73 
Apart from establishing the basic elements of a UDAP claim—that a particular 
act is either deceptive or unfair—and determining the appropriate and available 
remedies to seek, when assessing whether conduct related to a foreclosure of a 
mortgage might come within the reach of a particular state’s UDAP statute, 
litigants face several additional questions.  First, is a loan servicer or other entity 
involved in carrying out the foreclosure an entity covered by a relevant UDAP 
statute?  Second, does a particular state’s UDAP laws apply to mortgage 
transactions: that is, whether a credit transaction such as a mortgage is a “good” or 
a “service” where a particular state’s UDAP statute covers only the sale of goods 
and services?74  Third, does a particular state’s UDAP law cover “post-transaction” 
activities like debt collection, as opposed to applying only to unfair and deceptive 
practices in the marketing or consummation of a sale of goods or services?  As to 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 3-4. 
 71. Id. at 4-5.  
 72. As in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, state attorneys general, if they pool their resources, 
may be able to offset the strategic advantages that many defense counsel may enjoy when compared to 
the resources available to the attorneys of private, individual litigants.  For an overview of the history of 
tobacco litigation and the role played by the state attorneys general in that litigation, see Frank J. 
Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco 
Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473 (1998). Similarly, state attorneys general can avoid sticky problems 
of proof that individual litigants may face, like showing reliance by a particular consumer on a particular 
fraudulent communication.  Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota’s Tobacco Case: 
Recovering Damages Without Individual Proof of Reliance Under Minnesota’s Consumer Protection 
Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing the litigation advantages of public attorneys 
general).  
 73. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61, at app. A. 
 74. Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 792 (W.D. Ky 2003) (holding that not 
only under Kentucky’s UDAP statute does extending a mortgage qualify as the sale of a service but also 
that “nearly every state court deciding this question in similar contexts has also reached this outcome.”). 
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this question, many states’ laws expressly include such post-transaction activities 
within the range of conduct they cover.75   
Although there are many similarities among the various states’ UDAP statutes, 
there are also many differences and variations.  Some prohibit only “deceptive” 
acts, as opposed to deceptive and “unfair” acts.76  Some statutes specifically 
exempt certain types of financial institutions from their coverage.77  In order to 
assess whether a particular state’s UDAP law prohibits any particular acts in any 
specific jurisdictions, state attorneys general, advocates, and defense counsel will 
have to review their own state’s statutes for the specific limitations that apply to 
particular acts and actors within that state.78   
Despite these variations, many states have used UDAP laws to attack 
questionable mortgage market practices in the courts.  The following section 
surveys a number of cases in which state UDAP laws have been used against 
subprime mortgage lenders.  Attorneys general from nearly every state have 
attempted to use UDAP remedies to rein in and rectify some of the worst abuses 
seen in the mortgage market during its heyday over the last decade.  Following this 
next section, Section V, infra., looks at the specific application of different UDAP 
statutes to unfair or deceptive practices related to foreclosures to assess whether the 
acts that have come to be known as the Robo-Sign Scandal might qualify as 
actionable conduct under UDAP laws.  
IV.  APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS TO MORTGAGES. 
Across the nation, state attorneys general have filed a number of high profile 
actions under state UDAP laws and other consumer protection statutes against 
lenders active in the subprime mortgage market over the last decade.  Several high 
profile cases have resulted in sweeping settlements that resulted in the payment of 
penalties and attorneys fees, and forced lenders to reform their lending practices.  
Many of these settlements involved high price tags for the defendant-lenders, and 
many included remedial programs to help generate mortgage modifications and 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (West 2007) (“No supplier shall commit an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction.”)(emphasis added); CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61, at § 2.2.3. 
 76. For example, Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act applies to deceptive acts, but not ones that are 
unfair.  The express terms of the act provide as follows: 
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, deceptive act or practice, 
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or 
omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, 
suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise 
whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is 
declared to be an unlawful practice. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(A) (2007). 
 77. See, e.g., Virginia Consumer Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-199(D) (2011).  Other states 
with similar exemptions include: Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.  See 
CARTER, supra note 58, at 14.   
 78. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine in any specific instance whether any discrete 
robo-sign practice, by any particular actor, is a violation of any given state’s UDAP laws.  Instead, I 
have attempted to identify those interpretations of and precedents under various states’ UDAP laws to 
show that robo-sign practices appear to fall under such prohibitions generally.   
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offer relief to borrowers saddled with predatory loans. 
In one of the first of these settlements, in 2006, Ameriquest, which was at the 
time the nation’s largest subprime lender, resolved actions filed by forty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia alleging that the lender and its affiliates engaged in 
unfair and deceptive practices in the origination of subprime loans.79  Through the 
settlement, Ameriquest agreed to reform its lending practices and to pay $325 
million in damages.80  This payment included restitution to consumers, 
compensation to the attorneys general for the cost of bringing the action, and 
funding for consumer education.81  
Following the Ameriquest settlement, in 2007, the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts, Martha Coakley, filed a lawsuit against Fremont General 
Corporation (Fremont), a California-based subprime lender that had a large 
portfolio of subprime loans in the Bay State.82  After an FDIC investigation 
revealed that Fremont had engaged in predatory lending practices, Coakley’s office 
reached an agreement with the bank as to how it would handle foreclosures in the 
state.83  When the agreement was unsuccessful in preventing the foreclosure of 
loans Coakley’s office considered predatory in nature, she filed suit in 
Massachusetts state court, seeking an injunction under the state’s UDAP law that 
would prevent Fremont from foreclosing on any loan that had questionable 
features.84 
The heart of the accusations against Fremont included that the bank lured 
borrowers into Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) loans without taking into account 
those borrowers’ ability to repay the loans once the interest reset and that it offered 
100% financing options, with the expectation that the borrower could refinance the 
loan (with a prepayment penalty) after a few years.85  The trial court issued an 
injunction preventing Fremont from foreclosing on any loan deemed 
“presumptively unfair,” without first giving notice to the attorney general’s office 
and getting approval from the court.86  The highest court in Massachusetts, in 
affirming the lower court’s injunction, summarized Fremont’s practices as follows:  
[L]oans were made in the understanding that they would have to be refinanced 
before the end of the introductory period.  Fremont suggested in oral argument that 
the loans were underwritten in the expectation, reasonable at the time, that housing 
prices would improve during the introductory loan term, and thus could be 
                                                                                                                 
 79. E. Scott Reckard, Ameriquest Settles Claims: Accused of Misleading Borrowers with Credit 
Problems, the Mortgage Company Will Overhaul Its Lending Practices and Pay $325 Million, L.A. 
Times, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/21/business/fi-ameriquest21. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.   
 82. See Press Release, Office of Mass. Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley, Attorney General Martha 
Coakley Reaches $10 Million Settlement with Subprime Lender Fremont Investment and Loan (June 9, 
2009) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L= 
1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2009_06_09_fremont_agreement&csid=Cago. 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id.   
 85. Id.   
 86. The terms of the trial court’s injunction can be found in the lower court’s decision.  
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BL51, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 46, at *47-50 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2008), aff’d, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008). 
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refinanced before the higher payments began.  However, it was unreasonable, and 
unfair to the borrower, for Fremont to structure its loans on such unsupportable 
optimism.87 
Ultimately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the lower court’s 
injunction, forcing Fremont to give the requisite pre-foreclosure notice to 
Coakley’s office and to seek court approval of any foreclosure on a loan deemed 
presumptively unfair.88  The goal of these notice/approval mechanisms was to 
improve the chances that Fremont would renegotiate the terms of predatory loans 
by bringing the attorney general’s office and the bank to the negotiating table any 
time a delinquent loan had questionable features.89  The parties reached a 
settlement of the litigation in June of 2009 through which Fremont paid $10 million 
to Coakley’s office to be used in part to assist borrowers and made permanent the 
terms of the trial court’s injunction, barring Fremont from foreclosing on properties 
without the consent of either the attorney general or the court.90  
In a series of similar cases, with broader application—and an even higher price 
tag—Bank of America settled a group of lawsuits filed by 11 different attorneys 
general from across the country for the predatory acts of its subsidiary, 
Countrywide, which occurred prior to that lender’s purchase by Bank of America.91  
Many of these actions included claims under the different states’ UDAP laws, as 
well as common law fraud claims.92  In October 2008, Bank of America settled 
these actions for a record $8.4 billion.93  These billions were to be used for direct 
loan relief to an estimated 400,000 borrowers nationwide.94  In addition, under the 
agreement, Bank of America must attempt to modify mortgages to give borrowers 
more favorable and affordable terms, including principal reduction where 
appropriate.95   Through the settlement the bank is also supposed to provide 
financial assistance to families so that they can relocate if they do not appear able 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 558 (Mass. 2008). 
 88. Id. at 559-62.   
 89. See Press Release, supra note 82.   
 90. Id.     
 91. See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, NY TIMES, 
October 5, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht-
06countrywide.16713621.html. 
 92.  E.g., Complaint, California v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC081846 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 24, 
2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1582_draft_cwide_complaint2.pdf  
(alleging violations of California Business and Professionals Code section 17500 (prohibiting making or 
disseminating untrue or misleading statements) and section 17200 (prohibiting unfair competition)); 
Complaint, Connecticut v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 1207 (Conn. Super. Ct Aug. 5, 2008), available 
at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/countrywidelawsuit.pdf (alleging a violation of the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); Complaint, Illinois v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 
08CH22994 (Cook County Cir. Ct. June 25, 2008), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/ 
pressroom/2008_06/countrywide_complaint.pdf (alleging violations of Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Practices Act); Complaint, Office of the Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affairs, Florida v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08 30105 03 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 30, 2008), available at 
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-7G5G7L/$file/CountrywideComplaint.pdf (alleging 
a violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act). 
 93. Morgenson, supra note 91.   
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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to afford a loan even on more favorable terms.96 The agreement also requires 
borrowers assisted through the modification or relocation program to sign a general 
release, relieving Bank of America and Countrywide from any future liability for 
illegality in the terms of the original mortgages written by Countrywide. 97 
As I have argued elsewhere, these cases and others suggest that litigation in the 
wake of the financial crisis, and the foreclosure crisis that has followed it, 
possesses features that fit it within the category of cases known as “mass torts.”98  
In the mass torts context, litigation can be used to bring sweeping relief to a wide 
range of victims through procedural mechanisms that can facilitate global 
settlements of complex social problems.99  Deborah Hensler has identified some of 
the key features of this category of cases as follows: numerosity, commonality, 
interdependence of case values, controversy over causation, emotional or political 
heat, and higher than average claim rates.100  Other important hallmarks of mass 
torts litigation include aggregating techniques for adjudicating questions of 
liability, causation and damages, as well as  mechanisms for compensating 
plaintiffs through settlement;101 and collaboration among attorneys on both sides of 
the litigation, including sharing information about claim values, relevant evidence, 
discovery strategy, and litigation strategy.102   
To the extent that the acts underlying the Robo-Sign Scandal, and those efforts 
that may be used to rectify the harm emanating from it, may fit under the rubric of 
the mass torts paradigm, state attorneys general may pursue litigation and can use 
their authority under state UDAP laws to promote meaningful mortgage relief for 
borrowers whose properties have been swept up in the scandal.103  The tools at the 
disposal of state attorneys general in the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal—namely, 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. 
 97. See People  v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC081846, at 20 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2008), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments /press/pdf/n1618_cw_judgment.pdf.   
 98. See, Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: the Value of a Mass Torts Approach in Subprime 
Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009).  
 99. See id. at 13-17.   
 100. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1596 (1995). 
 101. Brescia, supra note 98, at 14.   See also Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25–40 (1991) (providing an overview of aggregative techniques). 
 102. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 863, 893 (2005) (describing the benefits of collaboration among counsel in mass torts 
litigation).  The state attorneys general have instituted just this type of collaborative effort, as the offices 
of all fifty state attorneys general are working together to investigate robo-sign practices and consider 
the law enforcement response.  See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys General, 50 States Sign 
Mortgage Foreclosure Joint Statement (October 13, 2010), available at http://www.naag.org/joint-
statement-of-the-mortgage-foreclosure-multistate-group.php. 
 103. Litigation by state attorneys general certainly fits under the mass torts umbrella; the massive 
litigation filed by a majority of the state attorneys general in the 1990s against the tobacco industry is a 
paradigmatic example of a mass tort dispute. See Howard M. Erichson, The End of The Defendant 
Advantage in Tobacco Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 135-36 (2001) 
(noting that state attorneys general have entered “the fray” in mass torts litigation on the plaintiffs’ side); 
Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L. REV. 935, 961-62 
(1999) (noting that litigation led by state attorneys general has been “uniquely successful” against 
tobacco manufacturers); ROBERT L. RABIN, REGULATING TOBACCO 177 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 2001) (describing role of attorneys general in tobacco litigation).  
34 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
for our purposes here, state UDAP laws—place such law enforcement officials at 
the nexus of a wide-ranging series of fraudulent acts.  Such acts have tainted 
foreclosure processes throughout the nation and raise questions about the 
legitimacy of title claims in tens of thousands, if not millions, of cases.  Mass torts 
litigation, with its aggregating techniques and its ability to achieve global 
settlements in complex disputes, is particularly suited to address the actions at the 
heart of the Robo-Sign Scandal.  As the next section argues, by pursuing UDAP 
claims (or perhaps just raising the threat of such claims), state attorneys general can 
generate positive social ends in the wake of the scandal, including a reduction in 
the social cost of the foreclosure crisis. 
V.  APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS AND REMEDIES TO THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS. 
This next section addresses two questions: first, whether state UDAP laws 
have been applied to practices related to foreclosure proceedings themselves; and, 
second, whether UDAP remedies offer creative and effective responses to not just 
the Robo-Sign abuses in particular, but also the problem of delinquent and 
underwater mortgages in general. 
A.  The Application of UDAP Laws to Foreclosures. 
A range of practices fall under state UDAP laws.  One of those practices is 
debt collection.  Courts routinely consider practices related to foreclosures as 
practices worthy of review under the rubric of state UDAP laws.  Courts have also 
recognized questionable servicer and lender actions related to the foreclosure 
process itself as giving rise to a UDAP claim. 
The leading case in this area, Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp.,104 was a 
bankruptcy proceeding filed in federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania.  There, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals construed Pennsylvania’s UDAP statute to find 
that deceptive practices undertaken during the course of carrying out a foreclosure 
gave rise to claims under that state’s UDAP laws.105  The appellate court found that 
the bank had engaged in two practices that justified such claims: first, the bank had 
knowingly served its foreclosure papers at the borrower’s former residence; and, 
second, it had sent out a 30-day notice of intent to foreclose on the borrower, but 
began the foreclosure process before the expiration of the 30-day time period set 
forth in the notice and required by state law.106  The court found as follows: 
Although the failure properly to serve the foreclosure complaint may not by itself 
be an unfair practice, here we have considerably more. Fidelity’s conduct 
effectively deprived Smith both of an opportunity to cure the default before 
imposing additional and unnecessary costs and expenses on her, and of her 
opportunity to defend in court. We hold that such conduct is “unfair” in the most 
basic sense of the word and fraudulent within the meaning of the UDAP.107  
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 107. Id. at 584-85. 
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Similarly, in an action filed in federal court in Massachusetts, the court in Morse v. 
Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association of Whitman108 found a violation of 
that state’s UDAP law where a lender engaged in a series of acts that ultimately led 
to the commencement of an unjustified foreclosure on a home mortgage loan.109  
There, the lender and borrowers had engaged in a series of transactions, and the 
lender had taken action against the borrowers for their apparent failure to maintain 
sufficient funds in a checking account to cover their expenses in running a small 
business.110  When the borrowers tried to tender payment on their mortgage in a 
proper and timely manner, the lender refused such payment, froze their personal 
checking account and improperly commenced a foreclosure action on their home 
mortgage.111 The jury found for the plaintiff-borrowers on their state UDAP claims, 
and the court endorsed that finding as follows:  
Improperly freezing the [checking] account, without notice . . . led to excess 
interest charges, and also may have led, ultimately, to a reduction in [plaintiff’s] 
credit sales. The wrongful institution of foreclosure proceedings, if nothing else, 
resulted in unjustified charges by defendant of its costs and attorney’s fees. 
Finally, defendant’s refusal to allow refinancing through [a second]  bank denied 
plaintiffs the use of a sum of money well in excess of their mortgage with 
defendant. . . .112 
The court found that all of these acts fell within the scope of Massachusetts’s 
UDAP law.113 
Similarly, in Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.,114 a case arising out of 
bankruptcy court in Massachusetts, the court there found that a pattern of lender 
activity in a foreclosure action gave rise to a claim under that state’s UDAP law.115  
There, the lender commenced a foreclose action after misapplying the payments the 
borrower had made to the lender and sending conflicting correspondence to the 
borrower about his level of indebtedness and whether he was even in default (partly 
because different units within the bank were not communicating effectively and the 
bank’s computer system was not accessible to all units of the bank dealing with the 
borrower).116  The court concluded that these actions constituted unfair trade 
practices in violation of the Massachusetts UDAP law.117   It awarded the borrower 
a range of relief, including attorney’s fees for the cost associated with filing a 
bankruptcy petition, an injunction, and an order directing the bank to communicate 
with credit reporting agencies to advise them that the borrower was not in 
foreclosure on the mortgage loan.118  
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Finally, in Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.,119 the Supreme Court of 
Texas found that a bank that had purchased a mortgage note from a third party 
lender could be liable to the borrower under that law for violations of that state’s 
UDAP laws.120  The third party, a contractor, had agreed to construct a residence 
for the borrowers, who, in exchange, executed a mechanic’s lien naming the 
contractor as the payee.121  The contractor both sold the loan note to the bank and 
completed only about twenty percent of the repairs, even after drawing down the 
bulk of the loan proceeds.122  The purchasing bank, in turn, went ahead and 
foreclosed on the property even though the work was not completed.123  The Texas 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the act of foreclosing on the 
property when the repairs were not completed was itself a violation of the state’s 
UDAP laws, even if carried out by the bank, which was not responsible for the fact 
that the work was not completed on the home.124  
As these cases make clear, unfair and deceptive practices carried out in the 
foreclosure setting itself can give rise to claims that a foreclosing entity violated a 
state’s UDAP laws.  As made apparent through the revelations from the Robo-Sign 
Scandal, lenders, servicers, and other entities processing foreclosure filings 
engaged in a range of deceptive acts, all of which would qualify as acts violating 
the key provisions of UDAP laws: filing false and misleading affidavits, forging 
and improperly notarizing those affidavits, and making claims that they had the 
authority to foreclose on mortgages when, at least in some instances, they 
possessed neither the ability to prove such claims or even the knowledge to assert 
them.  If such acts violate a particular state’s UDAP laws, what remedies might 
litigants pursuing UDAP claims seek?  The following discussion addresses these 
and other questions. 
B.  The Use of UDAP Remedies to Promote Loan Modifications. 
Given the broad and remedial nature of UDAP laws, the filing of fraudulent 
affidavits qualifies as a deceptive act under most states’ definition of the term 
under their respective UDAP provisions.  State attorneys general can thus pursue a 
range of remedies under their respective UDAP statutes, where such remedies are 
available, including civil penalties, restitution and injunctions.  In addition, the 
actual damages to borrowers wrongfully foreclosed upon would seem quite 
substantial, especially if they lost equity in their home or were rendered homeless 
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 124. Id. at 707-08.  In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that there could be no violation 
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as a result of a foreclosure in which a lender or servicer engaged in UDAP 
violations in carrying out that foreclosure.  Given the high stakes at risk when 
deceptive practices are utilized in the foreclosure process, the threat of substantial 
civil penalties and punitive damages, as well as injunctions preventing foreclosures 
from going ahead when tainted by robo-sign practices, is considerable.  At the end 
of the day, however, the prospect of a resolution to such claims that minimizes the 
threat of substantial penalties or injunctions barring foreclosures from taking place, 
or unwinding foreclosures already completed, should be enough to get lenders and 
servicers to the negotiating table to bring about solutions to the Robo-Sign Scandal 
that are more acceptable to borrowers, lenders, servicers and investors alike. 
Apart from resolving such defects, the best solution to the broader foreclosure 
crisis is principal reduction: i.e., bringing outstanding debt in line with home 
values.125  This both reduces the monthly payments borrowers must make and 
strengthens incentives to continue to make those payments by restoring the 
prospect of borrower equity in the home.  The threat of significant penalties and 
injunctions through state UDAP laws for the abuses evident in the Robo-Sign 
Scandal may be just the type of leverage needed to convince interested parties that 
such principal reductions are a more palatable resolution to UDAP enforcement 
actions than allowing them to drag out in the courts, where litigants may obtain 
more costly awards and more sweeping remedies.126 
Such principal write-downs would not be unprecedented in the UDAP 
enforcement context.  In both the Fremont litigation and the Countrywide/Bank of 
America settlements discussed above,127 UDAP prosecutions were used as leverage 
                                                                                                                 
 125. STIGLITZ, supra note 40, at 100 (calling mortgage principal reduction “the best option for the 
country.”).  One of the strongest critiques of mortgage modification programs during the current crisis is 
that they rarely result in a reduction of the principal of the underlying mortgage to bring it more into line 
with the value of the property in question.  See David Indiviglio, Only 0.1% of Government Mortgage 
Modifications Cut Principal?, THE ATLANTIC, June 24, 1010, available at 
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 126. Another point of contention in foreclosure litigation is the fact that a portion of properties 
impacted by the present foreclosure crisis are also a part of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System 
(MERS), which has come under a degree of scrutiny by courts and litigants recently.  See, e.g., In re 
Agard, No. 810-77338-reg, slip op. at 35-37 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (rejecting ability of 
MERS to assign mortgage); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2010) (same).  To 
resolve such questions, mortgagees may face similar demands as those that may be made of them to 
settle robo-sign disputes.  For a discussion of the MERS system, see Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory 
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2212-13 (2007).  For a discussion of the standing of 
MERS in foreclosure actions, see Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Lending and the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1375-86 (2010).  A further 
discussion of MERS is beyond the scope of this article, however. 
 127. See supra Part IV.  As this article goes to print, at least with respect to many of the state 
attorneys general and most of the largest banks, a settlement of charges over the Robo-Sign scandal, one 
38 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
to promote mortgage modifications, which could include principal reductions 
where appropriate.  Getting banks to the settlement table through the pursuit of 
UDAP actions for robo-sign abuses could be a primary goal of such actions.  
Should lenders and servicers wish to defend those actions on the merits, and risk 
judicial intervention that might translate into tens of thousands of dollars in 
penalties and punitive damages in each case, such would be their right.  At the 
same time, a sensible response to such actions by the institutions caught up in the 
Robo-Sign Scandal would be to consider more robust foreclosure mitigation 
strategies, including meaningful principal write-downs and reductions.  State 
attorneys general should not hesitate to pursue UDAP remedies for robo-sign 
abuses and, at the same time, they should be willing to discuss resolution of UDAP 
cases in ways that can help bring about mortgage principal reductions for 
borrowers that need such assistance.  
Furthermore, to the extent the investigation of robo-sign practices may expose 
deeper problems with title, failing to address these problems in a comprehensive 
way may mean that questions about title may linger, and costly litigation may 
ensue, for years to come, even in non-judicial foreclosure states.  An example of 
what may unfold over the coming years was made apparent in the recent decision 
out of Massachusetts in which a bank’s title to property seized after foreclosure 
was called into question, and its ability to sell such property after that foreclosure 
was rejected by the state’s highest court. 
In U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez,128 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court found that in two consolidated cases the failure on the part of two foreclosing 
banks to prove they had an interest in two mortgages meant that their non-judicial 
foreclosures of the affected properties were defective.129  The dispute over the 
rights of the respective parties in the underlying properties arose in quiet title 
actions filed by the foreclosing banks.130 The plaintiff banks had pursued an 
affirmative action to ensure that there were no questions clouding their title to the 
underlying properties.131  The court rejected the banks’ claims, saying they had not 
proven that they had the right to foreclose on the properties in the first place, and 
voided the foreclosures.132  As is apparent from this case, disputes such as these can 
arise in both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states (Massachusetts is among 
the latter group).  Unresolved real and perceived defects in title will likely create a 
burdensome drag on the alienation of property moving forward, as was the case in 
Ibanez.  The investigation into and potential litigation surrounding robo-sign 
practices may also serve to clear up these kinds of disputes by developing an 
effective mechanism for resolving such disputes.   
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VI.  FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE UDAP LAWS: A POTENTIAL BARRIER TO THE 
APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS TO THE FORECLOSURE CONTEXT. 
Even in situations where robo-sign practices are found to violate a particular 
state’s UDAP laws, there is still one more question that needs to be answered about 
the viability of UDAP claims in the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal:  whether a 
particular state’s UDAP laws are pre-empted by federal banking laws with respect 
to federally chartered financial institutions.133  As the following discussion shows, 
while this question is a legitimate one, it would appear that the scope of federal pre-
emption is not so broad as to encompass and displace the authority of state 
attorneys general to bring enforcement actions under state UDAP laws to address 
abusive foreclosure practices. 
To the extent national banks134 are caught up in the Robo-Sign Scandal, one 
issue that may arise in the investigation of this scandal is the extent to which 
federal law, most notably the National Bank Act, may pre-empt the ability of state 
attorneys general to enforce state UDAP laws.   For example, Bank of America is 
both a nationally chartered financial institution, which is organized under the 
National Bank Act and supervised by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), as well as the nation’s largest servicer of existing mortgage 
loans.135  Federally chartered banks like Bank of America may raise as a defense to 
any UDAP actions whether the fact that they are “national” banks pre-empts the 
                                                                                                                 
 133. It is also possible that defendants facing claims that robo-sign practices violate a particular 
state’s UDAP laws may raise several other arguments.  First, that actions filed in federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction and charging UDAP violations in the course of foreclosure proceedings may run 
afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  This doctrine holds that federal district courts should not review 
the actions of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479 
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 134. “National banks” are banks organized under the federal National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 
(2006), and regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under the Act.  Many of the 
largest banks, like Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup are national banks.  See OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LIST OF NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL BRANCHES AND 
AGENCIES ACTIVE AS OF 06/30/2011, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/licensing/national-
bank-lists/bank-list-national-by-name-v2.pdf.  Many subprime lenders, on the contrary, were mortgage 
lenders not given federal charters and generally not overseen by federal banking regulators. See David 
D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV.  21, 23 (2010) (describing the environments in 
which subprime lenders operated as “regulatory antimarkets, beyond the reach of federal and state 
regulators and without the safeguards protecting capital investment in what became ‘prime’ 
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 135. See E. Scott Reckard, Bank of America to Increase Loan Modification Staffing, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2010, at B2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/04/business/la-fi-bofa-loanmods-
20101204 (noting Bank of America’s status as the largest servicer of home loans in the nation after it 
purchased Countrywide Financial Corp. in 2008). 
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application of state law to their foreclosure practices.  In sweeping actions over the 
last fifteen years, both the OCC and the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
issued opinions and regulations that attempted to prevent state legislatures and state 
attorneys general from enforcing state laws against nationally chartered banks and 
thrifts.136   For the most part, these agencies were successful in preventing state-
based, anti-predatory laws from applying to federally chartered banks and thrifts, 
even if those banks provided services within the states in which those laws 
applied.137  In a 2007 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A.,138 the pre-emptive effect of federal laws was upheld, not just against 
federally chartered banks themselves, but also to the extent those laws applied to 
shield the subsidiaries of these banks from the application of many state banking 
laws.139  Due to the anti-regulatory philosophy of the Bush Administration,140 state 
attorneys general, and state laws they enforced, were often the last line of defense 
against predatory lenders.  But the pre-emptive effect of OCC and OTS regulations 
restricted the ability of these laws and state law enforcement officials to rein in the 
predatory practices of federally chartered banks at the height of the subprime 
mortgage frenzy of the last decade.   In the words of one state attorney general, the 
Supreme Court decision endorsing a broad view of pre-emption “‘took 50 sheriffs 
off the beat at a time when lending was becoming the Wild West.’”141  
While the Dodd-Frank legislation scales back the extent of federal pre-emption 
of state laws, the effect of such changes did not go into effect until July of 2011,142 
and such changes are only prospective: they do not apply retroactively.  But the 
fact that the changes to federal pre-emption of state banking laws did not go into 
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 140. Admittedly, the OTS’s pre-emptive regulations were adopted under President Clinton, but they 
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 141. Jo Becker, White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at 
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 142. Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57252 (Sept. 20, 2010) (Treasury Secretary’s setting of 
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date the new pre-emption rules take effect). 
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effect until the summer of 2011 does not end the debate in terms of pre-emption 
and state UDAP laws.  In fact, in June of 2009, the Supreme Court narrowed its 
prior ruling on pre-emption, and issued its decision in the case of Cuomo v. 
Clearinghouse Ass’n.143  That decision upheld the power of state attorneys general 
to bring enforcement actions against federally chartered banks under state law.144  
This power was framed in contrast to those entities’ inability to regulate federally 
chartered banks and thrifts in terms of their banking practices per se.145  In 
Clearinghouse, the Court found that a state attorney general does not have 
“visitorial” powers over a national bank, that is: it cannot inspect bank records or 
carry out the particular functions of a bank regulator when that bank is a national 
bank carrying out powers expressly granted it from the national government.146  At 
the same time, banks, whether they are national banks or not, engage in a range of 
practices that are covered by state law alone, like state civil rights statutes.  The 
Court held that an attorney general may bring judicial actions that seek to enforce 
such laws, regardless of the status of the bank as a national bank.147  This ruling has 
important implications in the UDAP setting, as the following discussion shows.  
At the same time, for the purposes of pursing claims against those banks 
involved in the Robo-Sign Scandal that might claim pre-emption under either OCC 
or OTS regulations still in effect, such pre-emption does not appear to impact the 
types of practices brought into question in this scandal.  Pre-emption is often 
invoked to prevent state regulation of federally chartered banks and thrifts in terms 
of the powers they carry out pursuant to their federal charters.  But state laws of 
general application, which are not directed towards federally chartered institutions 
in a discriminatory way—for example, by giving state chartered institutions a leg 
up on their federal counterparts—fall outside the scope of pre-empting laws and 
regulations.  As the Supreme Court in Watters made clear: “Federally chartered 
banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the 
extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the 
[National Bank Act].”148  
Moreover, consistent with protecting state authority to regulate in areas 
traditionally left to the states, laws related to property, contract and tort are 
generally preserved regardless of pre-emption.  This is particularly germane to any 
discussion of the Robo-Sign Scandal, where the actions of servicers and other 
foreclosing entities (to the extent they might be able to invoke federal pre-emption 
based on their status as affiliates of federally chartered institutions), are largely 
within an area of law typically left to the states, regardless of the status of the 
financial institution: i.e., state real property law.  Foreclosure processes are 
traditionally found in state laws, and there is no federal law of foreclosure.  In fact, 
the regulation that gave rise to the claims of OTS-regulated thrifts that they were 
exempt from state banking laws expressly exempts from preemption those state 
laws that “incidentally” affect the operations of OTS-regulated entities and are 
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more traditionally relegated to state law, such as contract, tort, criminal law, and 
real property law.149  Similarly, the OCC’s pre-emption regulations do not apply to 
state laws pertaining to contract, the “right to collect debts,” the acquisition and 
transfer of property, and any other law that only “incidentally” affects a national 
bank’s lending activities.150   
In one case in which the question of the scope of federal pre-emption of state 
UDAP laws figured prominently, the court, the federal district court for the 
Northern District of California, found that the manner in which a federally 
chartered bank handled mortgage payments was not exempt from the reach of 
California’s UDAP statute, regardless of the fact that the financial institution had a 
federal charter.151  In Jefferson v. Chase Home Finance, the court concluded as 
follows: 
The core of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action is the claim that Chase 
misrepresented how it would credit prepayments to Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff 
also contends that Chase’s systematic breach of the promises about how it would 
credit prepayments is an unfair business practice under the [California UDAP 
statute] . . . Plaintiff does not claim that California consumer protection laws 
require Chase to service or process loans, include specific content in its 
disclosures, or handle repayment of loans in any particular manner-requirements 
that would be preempted.  See 12 C.F.R. §34.4 (a).  Instead Plaintiff claims that 
the laws require Chase to refrain from misrepresenting the manner in which it does 
service loans. The core issue in this case will be not whether or when Chase is 
permitted to place payments in suspense accounts, but whether Chase 
misrepresented to customers what it would do with their payments. 
The duty to refrain from misrepresentation falls on all businesses. It does not target 
or regulate banking or lending, and it only incidentally affects the exercise of 
banks’ real estate lending powers. Chase has not articulated any way that 
enforcing state laws prohibiting misrepresentation to consumers would interfere 
with a bank’s nationwide operation or “obstruct, impair or condition” its ability to 
engage in real estate lending any more than those laws impair the operation of any 
business.152 
As the decision in Jefferson holds, regulating the representations the lender in 
question made about how it serviced the plaintiff’s loan—i.e., its disclosures about 
how it credited payments—is not pre-empted by the force of federal laws designed 
to ensure that state laws do not discriminate against federally chartered institutions 
or interfere with the manner in which the federal government regulates them.  
Holding federally chartered institutions to a duty of care that all businesses in a 
state must meet does not constitute an interference with essential federal rights. 
In the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal, to permit enforcement of state UDAP 
laws by applying them to the foreclosure practices of lenders and loan servicers, 
even when those entities are federally chartered institutions or their subsidiaries, 
preserves the state’s traditional authority over its laws concerning real property.  
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This area of law is one that has historically been exempt from the pre-emptive 
effect of federal banking laws, evidence of which is apparent from the OCC and 
OTS regulations, which, carve out exceptions for these laws from pre-emption.  To 
the extent federally chartered institutions and their subsidiaries have engaged in 
deceptive practices in terms of the tactics they have used in pursuing foreclosures, 
federal preemption should not be a barrier to state enforcement of UDAP laws 
against such tactics.153   
Moreover, even if a court were to find that certain regulatory functions of state 
attorneys general might be curtailed by federal preemption with certain entities, the 
ability of those offices to bring enforcement actions under those same laws would 
appear to have been preserved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo v. 
Clearinghouse Ass’n, discussed above.154  The meaning of the Clearinghouse case 
is still to be determined.  In any event, it preserves the ability of state attorneys 
general to bring enforcement actions against even federally chartered institutions. 
A question remains, though: do enforcement actions under state UDAP laws fall 
within the powers of an attorney general’s office authorized in Clearinghouse?  If 
so, even if the laws themselves may be pre-empted to the extent a regulatory body 
seeks to use them to carry out mere regulatory oversight of a federally chartered 
institution, the Clearinghouse decision seems to suggest that pre-emption would 
not limit the ability of state attorneys general to bring state enforcement actions 
under those same laws. 
Apart from this potential dispute over the meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Clearinghouse case, with respect to federal pre-emption of any 
enforcement actions directed towards federally chartered institutions and their 
subsidiaries under state UDAP laws, the following facts remain.  First, financial 
institutions that are not regulated by the OCC or the OTS would not be able to raise 
pre-emption as a defense.  Second, even federally chartered banks and thrifts would 
have to show that the application of the UDAP laws as they relate to foreclosure 
processes and the collection of debts are being applied in a discriminatory fashion 
in terms of federal banks and thrifts.   Finally, in order to invoke pre-emption as a 
defense, such institutions would have to show that such laws are not within the 
scope of laws traditionally enforced by the states, such as state laws related to real 
property, contracts, and torts.  As a result, it is unlikely that federal pre-emption of 
state UDAP laws is a significant barrier to enforcement actions brought to rein in 
the practices evident in the Robo-Sign Scandal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Robo-Sign Scandal has exposed deep flaws in the practices of many 
mortgage lenders and mortgage servicers.  These flaws expose those entities to 
liability under many states’ consumer protection laws, notably the collection of 
state statutes considered UDAP laws.  These UDAP laws are broad in their reach 
and offer litigants pursuing claims under them a range of remedies, from restitution 
to injunctions.  The threat of litigation from lawsuits under these statutes is real, 
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and the pressure to settle such actions in the wake of admissions of abusive 
foreclosure practices will be strong.  State attorneys general pursuing such claims, 
and wielding such threats can work with lenders and servicers to come to sensible 
solutions that not only root out abusive practices, but help reform the mortgage 
market.  There is no better place to start in this road to reform than working with 
lenders to write down and forgive mortgage principal.  This will help align 
borrower debt with the assets that secure that debt.  Short of such settlements, 
financial institutions face the prospect of stiff penalties, multiple damage claims 
and injunctions preventing them from bringing tainted foreclosure actions.  
Aligning borrower debt to home values will help re-align and balance incentives, 
reducing the risk of foreclosure for hundreds of thousands of borrowers.  Such a re-
alignment will also help stabilize the mortgage market by reducing the number of 
mortgages in the foreclosure pipeline and slowing the flow of properties entering 
the mortgage market at reduced, post-foreclosure prices.  Once supply slows, 
demand will rise, as will prices.   
The state attorneys general have an opportunity, through strategic use of their 
UDAP enforcement powers, to pursue claims that foreclosure practices ran 
roughshod over consumer protection laws and the laws that govern those 
foreclosures.  This opportunity can give rise to critical advances in stabilizing home 
prices and the mortgage market, and reduce volatility in those prices and markets.  
State law enforcement officials should not hesitate to pursue these claims and 
utilize all tools at their disposal to move from scandal to settlement, and uncertainty 
to resolution.  
 
